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ABSTRACT 
This study examines consistency between compensation systems and corporate 
performance. The main purpose is to analyse how the performance has affected the short-
term executive pay in Spanish banking system during the period 2004-2008. The main 
results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the sign of the 
variation of the performance, since the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the 
the pay-performance sensitivity is positive than when the variation of the results is 
negative. This finding is consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into 
question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and 
shareholders.  
Keywords: Top executive pay, performance, Spanish banking system, financial crisis, 
corporate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several developments over the past two decades have major implications for corporate 
governance, which have become an important issue for academics, professionals, legislators, 
and international agencies. Many corporate scandals in various developed nations have been 
characterized by weak mechanisms of corporate governance. This has motivated research and 
analysis of the relationship between good corporate governance and firm performance.  
From a theoretical perspective, several models argue that a proper governance structure 
reduces agency problems and conflicts of interest, generating value for the organization. 
However, the global financial and economic crisis has highlighted weaknesses in corporate 
governance, especially in the financial sector (Hilb, 2010; Smallman, McDonald, & Mueller, 
2010). In this context, an international debate has arisen on the effectiveness of the executive 
incentive system to ensure that executives make decisions consistent with the shareholders’ 
interest and to achieve long-term sustainability performance (Galbreath, 2012). In this 
respect, the European Commission (EC) (2010) suggests that the inappropriate compensation 
system established in the top executives has negatively affected the firms’ long-term viability 
and, consequently in the shareholders’ firm value.  
In the last two decades, the relevance of variable pay schemes has considerably 
increased. Theoretically, the purpose of variable pay should be to align the interests of 
managers with the owners. However, the European Corporate Governance Forum remarks 
that “experience has shown that variable pay schemes have become increasingly complex and 
that in certain instances this has lead to excessive remuneration and manipulation” (2009, p. 
1). In this regard, the EC also highlights that “the remuneration policies in the financial 
sector, based on short-terms profits without taking into account the corresponding risks, 
contributed to the financial crisis” (2010, p. 10).  
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The widespread public attention on executive compensation in financial sector suggests 
that the design of the compensation structure deserves closer scrutiny. Empirical studies 
(Adams & Mehran, 2003; John & Qian, 2003; Kaplan & Rauh, 2010) have found evidence 
that the structure and evolution of executive compensation differ between financial and non-
financial industries, which might be due to differences in the investment opportunities and the 
regulation between financial and non-financial industries. Nonetheless, the literature focused 
on financial firms and aspects of corporate governance, such as executive compensation, is 
still limited (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012). This study attempts to contribute to the 
compensation research by providing an analysis on executive compensation and corporate 
performance in the financial sector.    
Recent academic studies have examined whether flawed compensation structures in 
financial firms contributed to the most recent financial crisis (Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, 
Prabhala, & Senbet, 2010). However, to date there is no consensus whether compensation 
policies were a critical driver of the financial crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that no 
evidence exists that banks with a better alignment of the executive’s interests with those of 
the shareholders had higher stock returns during the crisis. Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2009) 
show that CEO (Chief Executive Officer) compensation packages that rely more on annual 
bonuses, and less on long-term equitiy-based compensation, are associated with greater losses 
in financial firms during the crisis and higher risk taking before the crisis. Hau and Thum 
(2009) find that higher executive compensation is positively associated with bank losses. 
Minnick, Unal, and Yang (2011) present evidence that banks with higher pay-performance 
sensitivity have significantly higher stock returns around the time of acquisitions 
announcements and align better the interests of the CEO with the interests of shareholders. 
These mixed results suggest that more rigorous investigation of compensation structures at 
financial sector is clearly needed.  
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This study extends the previous empirical evidence on compensation policy at financial 
firms focusing on the Spanish banking system, which has been in the brink of the collapse. In 
Spain, bank’s executives have long been criticized for their high compensation received in 
companies with poor performance. The depth of the economic crisis in the Spanish financial 
institutions and the intervention and nationalization of several banking institutions (Royo, 
2012) are incoherent with the millionaire salaries and severance packages received by their 
executive managers. This fact raises questions about the influence of executives to define 
their own incentive schemes. In this context, sporadic studies have explored the relationship 
between the characteristics of board of directors and the level and structure of compensations 
(Manzaneque, Merino, & Banegas, 2011) and between the economic performance and the 
ownership form of the bank (Crespí, García-Cestona, & Salas, 2004; Grifell-Tatjé, 2011) . 
However, research on the consistency between executive compensation and the corporate 
performance requires further development. 
This study fills in this gap and examines how corporate performance has affected the 
executive pay in the Spanish banking system during the period 2004-2008. This work follows 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and defines the relation between executive pay and performance 
as “pay-performance sensitivity” which shows how compensation varies with measured 
performance. Consistent with the managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; 
Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002), this study casts doubt on a linear relationship between 
executive pay and performance and aims to examine the pay-performance sensitivity 
depending on the sign of variation in bank performance. This study focuses on short 
executive pay (SEP), which does not include post-employment benefits or equity 
compensations benefits with the aim of providing robust results given the peculiarities of the 
financial institutions included in the sample and the limitation of public information, as well 
as avoiding that the research question could be biased by the possible effect of non-linear 
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association between stock options and firm performance (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 
2007; Hanlon, Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2003). 
This study contributes to research in several ways. First, it expands the managerial power 
theory because it introduces the variation of corporate performance and the ownership type as 
new factors in the general explanation of this theory. Second, it provides new empirical 
evidence related to a non-linear relationship of the pay-performance sensitivity depending on 
the sign of the variation of the performance in Spanish banking system. Third, this study uses 
a rigorous methodology that is consistent with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in 
each institution and controls endogeneity problems. Fourth, it advances the debate about 
whether the structure of executive compensation aligned the interest of managers and 
shareholders before and during the most recent financial crisis. Fifth it identifies new avenues 
for future research to advance the understanding of the relation between executive 
compensation and corporate performance.   
This work is divided into five sections. After this introduction this study presents a 
literature review and the hypotheses. The third section includes information on the sample, 
variables, and the methodology used in estimating the models. Section four presents the 
results and the final section offers the main conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
The relationship between executive compensation and company performance has been widely 
analysed from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argues that the incentives of managers can be aligned with the 
objectives of the shareholders through the design of a contract that links the compensations of 
executives with business results (Evans & Weir, 1995). However, Zingales (1998) remarks 
that it is impossible to perfect a priori contract that fairly shares quasi-rents generated by a 
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company to all its stakeholders, including executives and shareholders, and this quasi-rents 
will be captured by those groups with the most bargaining power.  
This controversy is extended to empirical works (Sánchez-Marín, Baixauli-Soler, Lucas-
Pérez, & 2010). On the one hand, most of the studies have revealed a statistically significant 
positive relationship between changes in the wealth of shareholders and the compensations of 
executives (Conyon & Schwalbach, 2000; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Lee, Lee, & Wu, 2010; 
Murphy, 1999) and this relationship is consistent with agency theory. On the other hand, 
other studies offer evidence for the existence of a negative or negligible relationship between 
performance and the compensations of executives, concluding that managers put its own 
interests before the aims of the company owners (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; 
Duffhues & Kabir, 2008). 
Devers et al. (2007) argue that the mixed findings that pervade the field may result from 
a narrow focus that failed to incorporate other theoretical perspectives and methodologies. 
Recent theoretical developments have expanded agency theory explanations of the incentive 
alignment construct (Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). In this vein, managerial 
power theory states that boards of directors approve compensation schemes that deviate from 
optimal contracting, since directors are subject to influence by management or are ineffective 
in overseeing managerial behaviour. As a result, top executives may camouflage or extract 
corporate rents by means of inefficient pay structures which are more in the interest of 
executives than shareholders. However, the evidence regarding the impact of CEO power on 
their compensations is insufficient and requires further studies (Tien, Chen, & Chuang, 
2013). 
Accordingly to the argument that top executives generally prefer a higher level of 
compensation that is less contingent upon performance, managerial power theory states that 
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top executives have influence over the board of directors to approve compensation contracts 
that are more favorable to receive higher levels of pay and less sensitive to performance (Shin, 
2013). In a recent meta-analysis (Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2012) on existing empirical 
studies focused on the managerial power theory, Van Essen et al. (2012) conclude that top 
executives with greater power tend to receive higher levels of total pay and total 
compensation. However, the authors find that the results for performance-pay sensitivities 
provide less support for managerial power theory. Van Essen et al. (2012) explain that this 
unexpected finding could be due to the existence of a non-linear relationship between CEO 
pay and performance, since the number of studies investigating non-linear relationships is 
relatively limited.  
Recently, few scholars (Canarella & Nourayi, 2008; Leone, Shuang, & Zimmerman, 
2006) have challenged the linear relationship between executive compensation and 
performance, and have examined a non-linear and asymmetric influence of performance on 
compensations, depending on whether the company is profitable or not. Yet no theoretical or 
empirical consensus exists on how this asymmetry is reflected. Canarella and Nourayi (2008) 
conclude that, from an accounting approach, a positive return by a company has a positive 
influence, although the executives are rewarded to greater extent for a positive return than 
they are penalized for a negative return. Leone et al. (2006) suggest that the salaries of 
managers are more sensitive to losses than to expected but unrealised profits. The authors 
state that these results are in line with the theoretical approach of the optimal contract. This 
approach is based on the idea that the implementation of an optimal contract reduces agency 
costs in relation to the expropriation of income from shareholders by the executives. 
Therefore, if the compensations of executives were more sensitive to expected profits than 
losses (the opposite case to that evidenced) then the executives may be rewarded for profits 
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that do not finally appear. If the compensation were not reimbursed then an ex post settling 
up problem would be created. 
While the limited previous studies have analysed the asymmetric influence of firm 
performance on executive compensations, depending on whether the company is profitable or 
not, none of these has considered a non-linear relationship of the pay-performance sensitivity 
depending on the variation of corporate performance. This study sets its aim in this 
underdeveloped area of investigation in order to advance the debate about whether the 
structure of executive compensation aligned the interest of managers and shareholders before 
and during the most recent financial crisis.   
The financial crisis has revealed weaknesses in the pay-setting process in the financial 
institutions since compensation schemes did not help mitigate agency problems and failed to 
closely align the interests of executives and shareholders (Faulkender et al. 2010). According 
to this argument, this study expands the explanation of the managerial power theory. This 
study states that whether the board of directors does not effectively oversee the design of 
incentive systems, the managers will have important influence over the compensation 
arrangements in order to serve their own interests rather than shareholders. In this case, it is 
expected that the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the variation in the corporate 
performance is positive than when the variation is negative. Consequently, this study tests the 
existence of a non-linear relationship that is asymmetrical in terms of pay-performance 
sensitivity to the sign of variation in bank performance. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is presented:  
H01: The short executive pay presents an asymmetric positive relationship with 
performance, since the short executive pay is more sensitivity with respect performance when 
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the variation in performance is positive than when the variation in performance is negative 
with respect the previous year. 
In this context, several empirical studies have estimated an econometric model where the 
explanatory variables are contemporary related with the explanatory variables. However, the 
assumption of not considering the dynamic behaviour of economic variables has been widely 
refuted. It is argued that the relationship between compensations and company profits is not 
only contemporary (Duffhues & Kabir, 2008; Murphy, 1999). Moreover in the short-term 
executive pay is taken into account the profit-sharing and bonuses if they are paid within 12 
months of the end of the period. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H02: The short executive pay is influenced by current performance and the performance 
of the previous year.  
It is also argued that the executive compensation is persistent over time, which makes 
this variable dependent on its own past. Canarella and Nourayi (2008) and Lilling (2006) 
incorporated the first lag of the dependent variable in the equation and concluded that there 
was a positive and significant relation between the variable and the first lag. Consequently, 
the following hypothesis is expected: 
H03: The contemporary executive pay is positively related to pay of the previous period. 
In the Spanish banking system there are important differences in the corporate 
governance between commercial banks and savings banks. Commercial banks are privately 
owned institutions with a concentrated ownership structure and with a strong shareholder 
control (shareholder-oriented approach). Spanish savings banks are commercial non-profit 
organisations (Hansmann, 1996), which have no owners or shareholders and are controlled by 
multiple interest groups: local and regional governments, employees, depositors and their 
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founding entities (stakeholder-oriented approach). Several authors (Crespí, et al. 2004; 
García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 2008; Sagarra, Mar-Molinero, & García-Cestona, 2013), 
have argued that the dispersed ownership structure and the lack of shareholder control of the 
savings banks could give managers more freedom of action and leave much room for abuse 
and corrupt practices. Therefore, according to managerial power theory, executive managers 
of Spanish savings banks have more power over the board of directors to negotiate for higher 
pay than executive managers of commercial banks. In this case, the following hypothesis is 
suggested: 
H04: The short executive pay in the Spanish savings banks is higher than the commercial 
banks. 
SAMPLE, VARIABLES OF THE MODEL, AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample includes banks and savings banks issuing securities admitted to trading on 
regulated markets from Spain for the period 2004-2008. According to the Spanish Securities 
and Investments Board, 22 banks and 42 savings banks are required to publish an annual 
corporate governance report (CNMV, 2008). Credit cooperatives were not considered 
because of their low market share in the Spanish banking sector. 
Data for the top executive pay has been extracted from the annual accounts and the 
annual corporate governance report for each bank. Additionally, the financial information 
from 2000 to 2007 for each bank has been obtained from Intertell database. The financial 
information for the year 2008 has been gathered from the annual accounts published by 
Spanish Securities and Investments Board. However, this information was collected until 
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May 2009 and in this date 11 banks had not yet published their accounts, therefore, some 
information is missing.  
Insert table 1 about here 
The available information was used to construct an unbalanced panel of 61 banks (22 
banks and 39 savings banks), which represents approximately 95% of the sample. After 
removing those financial institutions that did not have all the data and establishing that it is 
needed five years of continuous data, the final sample was a balanced panel of 195 
observations for 9 banks and 30 savings banks, which represents 61% of sample. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of the data included in each panel. In general, the data 
analysed does not show a normal distribution. Variables such as SEP and total assets are 
characterized by positively asymmetrical distribution and high kurtosis. 
Variables 
This article uses the panel data methodology since this study has the cross-sectional and time-
series data available. The models use the subscript ‘i’ ‘t’ to refer to a given variable 
corresponding to the i-th bank at time t. Following previous studies (Barontini & Bozzi, 
2011; Canarella & Nourayi, 2008; Duffhues & Kabir, 2008; Lilling, 2006; Perry & Zenner, 
2001; Shiwakoti, 2012; Vander Bauwhede, 2009), the neperian logarithm of executive 
compensation (ln(SEPit)) is used as the dependent variable of the model. As presented above, 
the executive compensation variable is measured by SEP. This variable includes the 
following concepts: wages, salaries and social security contributions, paid annual leave and 
paid sick leave, profit-sharing and bonuses (if payable within 12 months of the end of the 
period) and non-monetary benefits (such as medical care, housing, cars and free or subsidized 
goods or services) for current executives (IAS 19, 2003, pp.138). Following this definition, 
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SEP does not include post-employment benefits or equity compensation benefits for four 
reasons. The first reason is to homogenise the variable regarding executive compensation, 
since the savings banks are not listing on the stock market and therefore the stock options are 
not applicable. Moreover, the SEP represents a high percentage (83%) over the total 
executive pay. The third reason is due to the limitation in the public information available 
about long-term executive pay since the 37% of the analysed sample does not mention the 
long term executive pay in their annual accounts. The fourth reason is not to consider the 
possible effect of non-linear associations between stock options grants and firm performance 
(Hanlon et al. 2003; Devers et al. 2007), since the inclusion of the equity compensations in 
the applicable institutions (banks represents 23% of the sample) could bias the results of this 
study.  
An explanatory variables included in the model is the performance of the bank (Pit). This 
variable can be used as a proxy for the operating margin per unit of total assets, or for after-
tax profits per unit of asset; although the latter would mean taking into account operating 
profits, as well as extraordinary profits, or losses and discretionary provisions. Following 
Core et al. (1999), Duffhues and Kabir (2008), Ianotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) and the 
proxy used for the performance variable for each bank is the operating margin ratio divided 
by total assets, because this margin is the most faithfully reflects the performance of a bank. 
This study uses accounting ratios-based measures of performance because market-based 
performance measures cannot be applied in the majority institutions of the sample. Spanish 
savings banks do not issue shares, since they do not have owners or shareholders. 
Additionally, accounting-based measures reflect current performance, whereas market-based 
measures reflect investor’s perceptions of future value (Devers et al., 2007). 
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Another variable is the “SUBINDUSTRYit” which is defined by the two different 
ownership types examined in this study. Following previous studies (Crespí, et al. 2004; 
García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008), a dummy variable is used to reflect the 
differences between the Spanish savings banks and commercial banks. This dummy variable 
takes a value of 1 for Spanish savings banks and 0 for commercial banks. 
Despite the numerous recommendations (Comisión Conthe, 2006; EC, 2009) to increase 
the transparency of compensations for executives and directors as a measure against 
excessive salaries, the public information about compensations of executive remains partial. 
The salaries received by a bank’s key personnel are published as a global amount. In addition 
to this limitation in the information, the banks do not follow uniform criteria regarding the 
posts listed, nor do they list the roles played by key personnel. Furthermore, comparison is 
made more difficult because this variable shows a wide range in the sample used. Therefore, 
given the public information available, the dependent variable has been calculated dividing 
SEP by the number of executives that the bank lists as key personnel. In this regard, with the 
aim of controlling the fact that the average compensations of executives decrease as the 
number of key personnel increase, this study has included in the model the number of key 
personnel (NEit). Moreover, the differences in compensations among key personnel are lower 
in posts with lesser responsibilities and may even reach a minimum; therefore, this study has 
also introduced the squared in the number of executives (NEit2) in the model.  
With respect to other control variables, this study follows Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
and employs two measures related to banking business: the neperian logarithm of total assets 
(TAit) as an indicator of size; and the volume of credits granted per unit of total assets 
(CREDITit) as a proxy of banking activity. The efficiency of risk management is also 
included in the model. To this end, this study uses a dummy variable indicator of banks 
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authorised by the Bank of Spain (MA_RISKit) to implement the ‘internal ratings-based’ 
approach (IRB), because these banks, according to Basel II (BCBS, 2004), must have 
advanced management systems and risk measurement in place. Additionally, this study uses 
dummy variables for different years (YEARt).  
Methodology 
As indicated by Gibbons and Murphy (1990) agency theory suggests that the compensations 
of executives are related to performance in absolute or relative terms. This work has started 
from equation (1), which is a widely used model in the literature (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Murphy, 1985) that links executive compensation with the performance of a bank.  
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Model (1) from a time dimension focus includes the first lag corresponding to an 
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model because all the explanatory variables remain deterministic. However, the cross-
sectional and temporal nature of data means that consideration must be given to the existence 
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explicitly in the model, the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables will be biased, 
as they reflect some of the unobservable effects of each individual (Novales, 2000).  
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Equation (2) specifies the general econometric model of this work, where the error term 
is divided (ui,t) into two components: the individual effects (ηi) which include the effect of 
(1) 
(2) 
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non-observable variables in each bank, constant over time, and the stochastic disturbance. 
Traditionally, two transformations have been used of equation (2) to eliminate the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity: deviations from the group averages (within estimator) and time 
differences (Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; Perry & Zenner, 2001).  
Most studies assume that the explanatory variables of the model are exogenous as their 
values are taken as given, and so remain uninfluenced by the variable to be explained. 
However, in our model this hypothesis runs contrary to the empirical evidence, because from 
an accounting point of view, bank profit is affected by the salary costs of all employees 
(temporary and permanent). In this regard, recent studies suggest that analyzing the behaviour 
of some corporate governance variables in isolation may not be appropriate (Arellano & 
Vallelado, 2008). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that the compensations of the 
executives are persistent over time. Based on model (2), a lagged-dependent variable is 
introduced and the result is the model (3). In this model, this study tests the hypothesis H03 by 
analysing the sign and the significance of the coefficient of the delayed dependent variable.  
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In model (3) it is assumed that the relationship between the compensations of executives 
in logarithms and the performance of the bank is linear. By following Leone et al. (2006), this 
study proposes model (4) in order to test the nonlinearity and the existence of asymmetry in 
the relationship between the variations in performance and SEP, depending on whether the 
company performances were better or worse than the previous year (hypothesis H01). 
(3) 
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Where Ni,t is the dummy variable that indicates negative variations, respectively, in the 
performance of the i-th bank between two consecutive periods. That is: 
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This dummy variable is multiplied by the corresponding performance. In this way, 
equation (4) introduces two variables that reflect the negative variations in performance 
between the periods t-1, t and t-2, t-1. Specifically, this study uses a characteristic (the sign of 
the variation in performance) to define the two regimes of behaviour, and in this way, it 
should improve the linear approximation.  
In this context, the lag in the SEP is introduced as an explanatory variable, and this 
becomes related to the lag of the error term, so resulting in inconsistent estimates for both the 
within estimator and the first-difference estimator. An alternative method to avoid the 
discussed estimation problems for autoregressive models is to use an instrumental variable 
approach. Following the steps of Canarella and Nourayi (2008) and Lilling (2006), this study 
applied the GMM. Various forms of GMM estimators are feasible, depending on the 
definition of the conditions relative to the moments. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the 
GMM difference estimator. It takes advantage of all the conditions of lineal moments arising 
from the assumption of non-correlation with the error term.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrated one of the limitations of this estimator by 
showing that if the autoregressive parameter is close to unity and there are few time periods, 
(4) 
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then simulations will produce estimates with a large bias in finite samples and coefficients 
that are imprecisely calculated. To overcome their weakness as instruments with variable lags 
at various levels, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the 
system-GMM estimator. This estimator implies an additional restriction on the initial process 
conditions, so that all the available moments can be exploited through a system that uses lags 
in differences and levels of the dependent variable as instruments of the equation in levels 
and differences, respectively. 
This article uses the system-GMM that has been implemented using a two-step estimator, 
so that estimates are efficient and asymptotically robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Additionally, standard second-stage error correction as proposed by Windmeijer (2005) for 
small samples is applied. 
RESULTS 
Two-step GMM-system estimator 
In this section, the results have been obtained using the sample which is derived from the 
balanced panel, where data for five consecutive years for each bank is available. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) state that this is essential for testing errors are not second-order serial 
autocorrelation, condition necessary to ensure the robustness of the estimates.  
Insert table 2 about here 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the system-GMM models (3) and (4)1. This 
section focuses directly on model (4b) because the variables that reflect the asymmetry are 
statistically significant. If only the contemporaneous year is considered, it appears that there 
is a positive relationship between SEP and performance. Furthermore, the pay-performance 
sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the variation of the performance because whether the 
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variation in the performance of the bank is positive there is greater sensitivity (β1 =14.5783) 
to performance than when the variation is negative (β1+α1 = 3.3866). This difference in the 
pay-performance sensitivity depending on the sign of the variation of performance calls into 
question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and 
shareholders. This result supports the hypothesis H01 and is consistent with the managerial 
power theory, which states that executives may influence the pay-setting process in their own 
interests.  
The findings show that the compensations of executives are affected by the current 
performance. However, surprisingly the direct influence on compensations of the 
performance of the previous period is not clear, therefore, this study cannot provide clear 
evidence regarding the hypothesis H02. It could mean that the executive has been motivated to 
make decisions based in the improvement of the immediate corporate performance. 
The estimate of the coefficient for the lag of the variable dependent is 0.5391 and 
statistically significant. Thus, the hypothesis H03 is confirmed and, this study finds evidence 
in the sample examined that the executive compensation is persistent over time, which makes 
this variable depend on its own past. 
Surprisingly, this study does not find enough evidence to support the idea that Spanish 
savings banks have more power over the board of directors to negotiate for higher pay than 
executive managers of commercial banks. Therefore, the results reject the hypothesis H04. It 
could be due to the limited and unbalanced sample of banks respect to savings banks of this 
study. Large samples of banks are clearly needed to test the robustness of this result. 
The control variables generally show the expected sign although they are not statistically 
significant, with the exception of the variable size which is statistically significant and 
positively related to the executive pay. 
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Validation of the results 
The data used for the estimations in the previous sections is shown in nominal terms. 
However, this work has repeated the empirical study using data in real terms and the results 
are similar to those discussed above. To this end, the data for economic variables has been 
deflated using the general index of consumer prices published by the Spanish national 
institute of statistics with 2004 as the base year. The analysis has also been repeated using the 
methodology proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) applied in unbalanced panel. The signs 
of the variables have not generally changed – and the values of the coefficients have not 
altered substantially2. 
Additionally, Table 2 shows the joint statistical significance and validation of 
instruments for each regression. The Wald test was used in all the estimates to reject the null 
hypothesis that the variables are jointly equal to zero. The Hansen over-identification test was 
made on models (3) and (4) and revealed that this study cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
validity of the instruments being used to control the problem of endogeneity. Focusing on the 
autocorrelation test, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis that errors are not second-
order serial autocorrelation. These results do not reject the validity of the results of the 
empirical study. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The recent controversy over the excessive executive pay associated with the corporate 
scandals and the financial crisis has called into a question the effectiveness of the executive 
incentive system to ensure that executives make decisions consistent with the shareholders’ 
interest. In this context, this paper contributes to this debate by providing empirical evidence 
regarding the relationship between executive pay and corporate performance in the Spanish 
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banking sector. In particular, the aim is to examine the pay-performance sensitivity 
depending on the sign of variation in bank performance. 
From a theoretical point of view, this study expands the explanation of the managerial 
power theory which states that top executives may influence the pay-setting process to 
approve compensation schemes that are more favourable to executives than shareholders. In 
accordance with this reasoning, this study suggests that executives may have influence to 
change the pay-performance sensitivity in their own interests depending on the sign of the 
variation of the performance.  
From a methodology perspective, the article discusses the novel use of GMM that 
controls endogeneity problems and is consistent with the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in each bank. Given the small sample size, this study additionally implements 
standard Windmeijer error correction. 
The main results reveal that short executive pay is positively associated with 
contemporaneous corporate performance, as well as present an asymmetric relationship in 
terms of sensitivities. The asymmetry in the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the 
variation in results is positive than when the variation of the results is negative. This result is 
consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into question the role of the pay-
performance incentives to align interest of executives and shareholders.  
Regarding practical implications, the paper reveals that in spite of the numerous 
international recommendations in related to increase openness in executive compensation, 
there are numerous limitations in obtain public information about the compensations, mainly 
in long-terms executives pay and in individual terms, and without this information the 
shareholder and the rest of stakeholders can not control over excessive executive 
remuneration. Moreover, the results suggest that the board of directors and banking 
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regulation should improve the supervision on the executive pay-setting process with the aim 
of ensuring that pay-performance incentive fulfills its purpose to align the interest of 
executive and shareholders. 
This study has limitations that might open new areas for future research. The results of 
this study might be limited by the sample, the availability of information and the variables 
used in the empirical models. Future studies could move beyond Spanish savings banks and 
commercial banks to focus on cross-national studies to identify best practices and explore 
how context shapes managerial practices. In addition, the differences in incentive systems 
between Spanish savings banks and commercial banks could be further explored. To test the 
robustness of this study, future works should use more finely grained measurements of 
executive pay and could examine the non-linear relationship between performance and the 
four pay components: salary, bonus, equity participation and post-employment 
compensations. Moreover, this study could be extended to pay-volatility sensitivities which 
would be another fruitful avenue for new and interesting theoretical and empirical 
developments. Finally, this study encourages further research on the question whether the 
compensation structures in financial firms contributed to the instability, excessive risk-taking, 
and the most recent global financial crisis. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 In order to give robustness to the results, model (4) is divided into (4a) which does not include the squared in 
the number of executives; and (4b) which has the same specification as the original model. 
 
2 The results using the deflated variables and the incomplete sample are not presented in the work, but are 
available to readers upon request. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
(Unbalanced panel Obs.=303, N=61, T=5) 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. 25th P. 50th P. 75th P. Skw. Kurt. 
Executive compensation 
Short-term 
pay 
256 295,216 348,053 139,347 177,347 286,264 3.561 17.535 
Long-term pay 162 60,655 119,084 6,300 15,222 68,375 5.582 44.343 
Performance 
(Operating 
Profits)/TA 292 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.566 4.768 
(Alter Tax 
Profits)/TA 292 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.968 3.927 
Entity characteristics 
TA (mmll €) 292 32.600 64.300 5.250 10.700 24.800 3.741 18.176 
CREDIT/TA 292 0.818 0.083 0.766 0.829 0.866 -0.892 5.208 
Nº Executives 261 10.586 4.872 8.000 10.000 13.000 0.774 3.645 
         
(Balanced panel Obs.=195, N=39, T=5) 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. 25th P. 50th P. 75th P. Skw. Kurt. 
Executive compensation 
Short-term 
pay 
195 298,710 361,082 139,250 175,500 290,357 3.665 18.150 
Performance 
(Operating 
Profits)/TA 195 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.013 -0.451 5.595 
(Alter Tax 
Profits)/TA 195 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.823 4.043 
Entity characteristics 
TA (m.mll €) 195 30.400 56.500 6.160 10.600 28.700 4.298 25.204 
CREDIT/TA 195 0.800 0.075 0.752 0.810 0.853 -0.775 4.022 
Nº Executives 195 10.923 4.779 8.000 10.000 13.000 0.925 3.890 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the data included in unbalanced and balanced panel. 
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Table 2: GMM-System estimator. Model (3) and (4) 
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Dependent Variable: 
ln(SEPi,t) 
 Model 3 Model 4a  Model 4b 
ln(SEPi t-1)  
0.5560* 
(0.2985) 
0.5368* 
(0.2667) 
0.5391*** 
(0.1758) 
Pi,t  
  14.0343 
(8.8337) 
  10.4059* 
(5.3397) 
  14.5783** 
(7.0232) 
Pi,t-1  
-7.1305 
    (9.8117) 
3.1943 
  (10.7137) 
6.3467 
  (10.5755) 
Pi,t* Ni,t  
   -7.2656** 
(3.4549) 
 -11.1917** 
(5.0289) 
Pi,t-1* Ni,t-1  
   -6.3034** 
(2.4737) 
  -7.5095** 
(2.9684) 
SUBSINDUSTRYi,t  
  -0.0985 
(0.1026) 
  -0.0930 
(0.0983) 
  -0.0836 
(0.0672) 
NEi,t  
  -0.0355 
(0.0231) 
  -0.0102* 
(0.0057) 
  -0.0249 
(0.0193) 
NE2i,t  
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
 0.0006 
(0.0008) 
ln(AT)it  
0.1709 
(0.1146) 
0.1701** 
(0.0821) 
0.1744*** 
(0.0595) 
CREDITi,t  
  -0.4947 
(0.3867) 
  -0.2986 
(0.4377) 
  -0.2564 
(0.3377) 
MA_RISKi,t  
0.1979 
(0.2406) 
0.2444 
(0.2871) 
0.2230 
(0.1911) 
CONSTANT  2.2262 
(1.4344) 
2.1006 
(1.8370) 
1.9707 
(1.1917) 
 
Explanatory variables 
(test wald) 
  97.77*** 
 [ 9, 38 ] 
  84.00*** 
 [ 10, 38 ] 
164.51*** 
 [ 11, 38 ] 
Year dummy variables 
(test wald) 
  0.86 
 [ 3, 38 ] 
  2.72* 
 [ 3, 38 ] 
  2.61* 
 [ 3, 38 ] 
F test   89.00*** 
 [ 12, 38 ] 
  67.92*** 
 [ 13, 38 ] 
138.51*** 
 [ 14, 38 ] 
 
Hansen test χ2    30.64     [ 36 ]
  24.15 
    [ 43 ]
  22.10 
    [ 44 ] 
 
AR1    -1.78*   -2.00**   -2.18** 
AR2     0.93    1.20    1.01 
Te table reports the two-step GMM system estimator. The dependent variable is executive compensation 
(ln(SEPi,t)). Explanatory variables are: contemporary and first lag of performance (Pi,t, Pi,t-1) , negative variations 
in performance between t-1, t (Pi,t* Ni,t), negative variations in performance between t-2, t-1 (Pi,t-1* Ni,t-1), 
ownership type(,  SUBINDUSTRYi,t) and the control variables that measure: number of executives (NEi,t), 
number of executives squared (NE2i,t) bank business (ln(AT)it, CREDITi,t,, MA_RISKi,t) 
Standard errors with the robust adjustment for small samples proposed by Winddmeijer (2005) are in brackets. 
Statistically significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*).  
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